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1 Introduction
In terms of their ability to create jobs and economic growth, many Euro-
pean economies have been disappointing for a fair amount of time. It is
often suggested that the most useful way to approach this issue is to recog-
nize that it is entrepreneurship that is the key engine in economic progress.
Indeed, in any economy it is the entrepreneurs innovation e¤ort and risk-
taking that create most of a nations value-added, provide jobs and generate
income, and o¤er a source of revenue to enable the government to carry out
its social tasks. Enterprise formation arises from the occupational choice of
individuals at the start of (or during) their active working life. In industri-
alized economies, only a relatively low although diverse, number of people
choose entrepreneurship.1 Although there is extensive literature on labour
market performance, its interaction with enterprise formation has not been
addressed. The current paper undertakes such a research task by bringing
together the literature on labour market institutions and the occupational
choice model of entrepreneurship.
In our paper, enterprise formation, wage determination, and optimal rm
size are examined in an occupational choice model under two alternative
wage formation mechanisms. In the benchmark case with competitive labour
markets, we show that it is the underlying technology that determines the
rate of entrepreneurship. In the union model in stead we show the equilibrium
rate of entrepreneurship decreases in the unions strength in wage setting.
As entrepreneurship results from a risky occupational choice, it can hardly
be understood without due consideration of risk-taking.2 While the welfare
state provides social risk insurance for workers in the form of unemployment
compensation and other labour protection measures, insurance against busi-
ness failure is out of the question in a market economy, and for good reason.3
1Empirical data (OECD Labor Force Statistics) show that the rate of entrepreneurship
(when measured in terms of entrepreneurs and those working on their own account as pro-
portion of the total labor force), varies greatly between di¤erent economies. For example,
in 1990, Norway (5.4%), Austria (5.6%) and Denmark (5.9%) were examples of countries
with a below-average rate of entrepreneurship, while Belgium (11.4%), Ireland (10.2%),
the UK (10.6%) and Australia (11.9%) were examples of countries with a much higher rate.
Most central European countries fell between these two levels, while the Mediterranean
countries typically have higher rates of entrepreneurship resulting from their high rate of
self-employment. For an evaluation of the empirical studies, see Parker (2004).
2The view of entrepreneurs as primary risk-takers is deeply rooted in the Knight-
ian tradition (Knight (1921)). The well-known complementary Schumpeterian view (cf.
Schumpeter (1942)) depicts entrepreneurs as innovators, the heros of economic progress.
3Such risks show up in the unpredictability of entrepreneurial earnings representing the
residual claim, in risky capital income, and in bankruptcy rates. The data reported by
Eurostat (see Enterprises in Europe, Fourth Report (1996)) suggest that the failure rate
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Entrepreneurial risks cannot be socialized for moral hazard reasons while
labour protection measures serve a well-dened social purpose. Individuals
with industry-specic human capital need protection in conditions in which
markets do not provide such insurance. As showed by Booth (1996), an e¢ -
cient outcome can be obtained even in conditions in which incumbent workers
and rms are bargaining over wages and redundancy pay simultaneously.4
After ignoring it for a long period, the economic profession reintroduced
entrepreneurial risk-bearing into the theory of the rm in the late 1970s. The
economic underpinnings were analyzed in a few pioneering papers, including
Lucas (1978), Kanbur (1979, 1981), Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979), and more
recently Newman (1995), Fölster and Tromov (1997), Blanchower and
Oswald (1998) and Boadway et al. (1998).5 Lucas (1978) introduced the
notion of ability di¤erences to explain enterprise size distribution and growth
in his work on Gibrats law. Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979) on the other
hand, suggested that less risk-averse agents would become entrepreneurs,
and moreover that the lower the rate of risk aversion, the bigger the size
of the rm. According to Kanbur (1979), entrepreneurs are self-selected
without knowledge of their ability, while Boadway et al. (1998) suggest
that di¤erences in ability (to sell the product) give rise to di¤erent success
probabilities. Empirical research caught up in the late 1980s, utilizing both
longitudinal, time-series and cross-sectional data.6 It is a frequently reported
empirical regularity that nance and liquidity matter in the formation of
new enterprises.7 The rise (and subsequent fall) in venture capital nance in
backing start-up rms in the 1990s led to a substantial increase in studies
on issues related to entrepreneurship. It also came to be understood that
informational asymmetries tend to facilitate the entry of low-quality projects,
subsidized implicitly by high-quality projects (De Meza and Webb (1999)).
Entrepreneurship hinges upon a number of further mechanisms, including
of new rms in the European Union is substantial in the early years of business. After
the rst year, 20% of new rms close down, 35% have disappeared within the rst three
years, and after ve years, only 50% remain in the market, see also Geroski (1995).
4However, private contracts cannot undo policy-determined labor market regulation
measures as the insurance elements created by those regulations raise the union bargaining
power (Kanniainen and Vesala (2004)).
5The literature on self-employment up to the early 1990s is reviewed in de Wit (1993b).
6For a representative sample, see Blau (1987), Evans and Leighton (1989), Evans and
Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994a, 1994b), Van Praag and Van
Ophem (1995), Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), Lindh and Ohlsson (1998), Blanchower (2000)
and Johansson (2000).
7Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Black, De Meza and Je¤reys (1993), De Wit (1993a),
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994a,1994b), Blanchower and Oswald (1997), Lindh
and Ohlsson (1996), and Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999).
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the quality of ideas and of entrepreneurs, and their willingness to provide
e¤ort, not to mention their preference for independence. Country-specic
structural or cultural determinants may not be less important.8 Previous
studies have also established that the prot motive may not fully capture
the reasons why some people become entrepreneurs.9
It has been recognized in the literature of industrial organization that
diminishing returns determine the limits of industries and rm size. It has
also been suggested that existing rms may undertake strategic pre-emptive
actions in order to create entry barriers and block competition. Institutions
also tend to adapt to new situations.10 Moreover, unemployment may push
some people toward establishing their own enterprises and furthermore many
start-ups are initiated as spin-o¤s from existing rms. The development of
entrepreneurship may thereby be a state-dependent cumulative process.
With its focus on the interaction between labour market institutions and
entrepreneurship, our work di¤ers from that reported in previous papers.
After arriving at some results in the context of a competitive labour market,
we explore the formation of enterprises in a unionized economy. Such a
research task appears particularly relevant in the European context. With
a few exceptions, the link between labour markets and entrepreneurship has
not been analyzed.11 We abstract from nancial constraints and normalize
entrepreneurial ability across individuals. Risks are assumed to be aggregate,
and economy-wide, hence correlated. We thus focus on the market risks
arising from business cycles. We assume that market entry is subject to
costly ex ante commitment, which could be viewed as a cost of developing
the idea or carrying out the necessary investments in human capital. It could
also arise in the form of an asset risk, i.e. from the allocation of private assets
to risky productive use. Ex post, such a cost is sunk and cannot be recouped
in the case of default.12
8For documented empirical evidence, see also Lindh and Ohlsson (1997) and Ilmakun-
nas and Kanniainen (2001).
9Hamilton (2000), Holtz-Eakin, Rosen and Weathers (2000), Gentry and Hubbard
(2000).
10For instance, enterprises may be created by the contracting out of some activities.
The boundaries of enterprises thus tend to be endogenous.
11Empirical ndings of the cross-country studies conducted by Ilmakunnas and Kan-
niainen (2000) and Kanniainen and Vesala (2004) support the view that labor market
institutions indeed tend to interact with enterprise formation.
12Given outside credit nance, contracts tend to impose substantial liability on start-
up entrepreneurs, or given outside equity to entitle them to a fraction of residual claims.
Entrepreneursinvested wealth is thus subject to default risk, while non-entrepreneurial
agents face no such risk. For a failing entrepreneur, there is also a psychological cost in
terms of social stigma.
3
In our analysis, we build on the well-known right-to-manage model of a
unionized economy.13 We point out that one of the implications is that tradi-
tional labour union models are subject to a particular limitation as they take
the production sector and industry size as exogenously given. They have
overlooked the fact that forward-looking market entry, shaping the busi-
ness dynamics, and labour demand, are not immune to the wage bargaining
process in the post-entry stage.
Our analysis suggests a number of insights into enterprise formation.
In the benchmark case of competitive labour markets when unions are not
present, we show that the rate of entrepreneurship, the optimal rm size and
the wage rate are all determined by the underlying technology. Given the
sunk cost of entry and uninsurable business risk, risk-averse agents demand
a risk premium when choosing a risky entrepreneurial occupation.14 In the
unionized economy, unions stabilize the wage rate across states. As usual,
the negotiated wage positively depends on the unions bargaining power. We
prove that a high bargained wage unambiguously reduces the level of en-
terprise formation. Our reasoning is as follows. With a higher wage rate,
the incentive for individuals to abstain from entrepreneurship is enhanced
and it becomes more attractive to enter the labour market instead. On the
other hand, higher wages tend to decrease the probability of nding a job,
thereby having a counter-e¤ect, i.e. pushing people into entrepreneurship.
Our analysis shows that it is the negative e¤ect that dominates. There is
more to it in that the average enterprise size is reduced and the optimal rm
size depends adversely on the union power. Moreover, while the optimal size
of a rm is independent of the state of market demand when labour markets
are competitive, we show that this is not the case in the union model.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce a model of a rm under
market uncertainty, labour unions, and the occupational choice of individuals
in section 2. In section 3, we rst analyze the benchmark case of competitive
labour markets in which unions do not exist, and then we formulate a model
of wage bargaining with a rms right to manage its labour force ex post.
We examine the formation of enterprises in a unionized economy in section
4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
13See, for instance, Oswald (1985), Farber (1986) and Booth (1995).
14We note that Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001) have obtained a result
that higher start-up costs discourage entrepreneurship. Their search theoretical model,
however, has a di¤erent set-up as they abstract from risk-aversion.
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2 The Model
Occupational choice The economy consists of identical risk-averse in-
dividuals with mass one. At the outset, the individuals face occupational
choice between entrepreneurship (n) or joining the labour force, employed or
unemployed (1  n). Enterprises will be run just by one individual.
Price uncertainty and entry cost The economy has one production
sector. The product market is assumed to be competitive. The exogenous
market price obtains the value p = p with probability  and the value p = p
with probability 1  ; p < p .15 Each entrepreneur and therefore its labour
thus face price risk. Entry of a start-up rm means that the entrepreneur
commits to an entry cost, k > 0, assumed to be sunk. Each entrepreneur
faces the risk of being unable to recoup the sunk cost k, uninsured by private
risk markets or social insurance. Her liability cannot be limited by such
devices. Her risk is non-diversiable. Her labour faces unemployment risk.
The labour is, however, assumed to be protected by social insurance in the
form of unemployment compensation. As start-up entrepreneurs are subject
to a strictly positive sunk cost, the risk adjusted expected return has to
compensate for the failure risk.
Technology After commitment to an entry cost, each entrepreneur has
access to production technology of constant elasticity variety
f(l) = l;  < 1; (1)
where l is the number of workers in a rm, a measure of a rm size. The
entrepreneur is the necessary input in hiring the labour and organizing the
production; the output without him is zero. After resolution of price uncer-
tainty, the prot of each rm is
 = pl   wl; (2)
where p = fp; pg; the realized price.
labour unions Given our assumption of homogenous labour, we can build
on the standard labour union model.16 The union has an objective of max-
imizing the expected utility of its members. The income of an employed
15We simplify the demand side and assume perfectly elastic market demand as we focus
on the supply side, i.e. formation of enterprises.
16Petrakis and Vlassis (2000) have shown that if the unions power is su¢ ciently high,
universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Agell (2002) has introduced
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member is the wage, w: The income of the unemployed, b, is exogenous, sat-
isfying b  w; and is independent of the current variables. One interpretation
of b is that it is an unemployment compensation. The utility of a member is
of the constant elasticity type. The ex post utility of the union, conditional
on observed price, is introduced in the form of a utilitarian variety
U = nlU(w) + (1  n  nl)U(b) (3)
= nlw + (1  n  nl)b;  < 1:
Our formulation di¤ers from the standard union model in that the number
of entrepreneurs is endogenous in (3). The market for entrepreneurship is
open only once for the reasons of the sunk cost.17
The market price and the outcome of wage bargaining will dictate the
optimal size of each rm, measured by employment. Workers face the risk of
becoming unemployed. The employed and unemployed workers are assumed
to be chosen randomly with probabilities nl=(1 n) and (1 n nl)=(1 n):
Entry condition The expected utility of the entrepreneurial income, prior
to price observation and adjusted for the sunk cost of entry, has to be su¢ -
cient to compensate for the expected utility of income earned as an employee.
In other words, EpU [   k] = Ep[U ], or
Ep(   k) = Ep( nl
1  nw
 +
1  n  nl
1  n b
): (4)
This condition determines the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship (en-
try), n: The timing of our model is as follows. At time t = 0, individuals
make their occupational choice. Entrepreneurs commit to an entry cost,
k > 0. After entry, the rms and the union observe the price: At time t = 1,
the wage rate w is negotiated. At time t = 2, the entrepreneurs choose their
labour input (rm size), l, in the light of their right to manage.
a di¤erent union model, arguing that with heterogenous labor, insitutionalized wage com-
pression operates as a welfare-enhancing device, providing social insurance, albeit at a
cost of unemployment for those who hold the bad jobs. He focused on labor income risk,
abstracting from business risk, which, however, ougth to be the cause of the employment
risk of workers. Moreover, his model abstracted from aggregate risks, overstating a unions
ability to provide an insurance for its members. We abstract from unions as an insurance
device. In the current approach with aggregate risks, its potential role as an insurance
device is limited, as the social insurance is provided by the government.
17One can interpret this to mean that once the labor contracts have been settled, those
who become unemployed have the option of self-employment outside the labor market.
The outside income b can then be alternatively viewed as income from self-employment.
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3 The Analysis of labour Market Institutions
and Entrepreneurship
3.1 Entry under Competitive labour Markets
Consider rst the case of competitive labour markets with no unions as a
benchmark. We do this for two reasons. First, we can examine the role of
technology. Second, we can see the role of the sunk cost in terms of prot
premium. As the logic of a competitive labour market is very di¤erent from
the bargaining model with a union, the reader should bear in mind that
the latter model cannot be obtained as a limiting case by making the union
bargaining power approach zero in the union model to be introduced in the
next section.
Entry is irreversible but employment decisions are made after resolution
of price uncertainty. There is no role for unemployment compensation be-
cause, by denition, there will be no unemployment. Market wage adjusts to
provide full employment. Such an economic structure raises, of course, tricky
welfare issues. Risk-averse workers are willing to pay for an insurance against
income risk. Risk averse entrepreneurs may not have the ability to provide
it. With large-scale corporations with diversied ownership, and access to
nancial contracts, insurance would become available as part of labour con-
tracts adjusted for an insurance premium. With homogenous labour, tax on
labour income could not be used to provide an insurance. Such thoughts
point to the complexity of normative issues. Here, we restrict our analy-
sis to positive issues, only. We establish some key results in a most simple
model. The competitive world is not introduced to provide a yardstick in
terms of a welfare analysis but to provide results related to technology and
risk-aversion. The technology and risk-related mechanisms will then below
be spiced by the union e¤ects.
Assuming that the utility of agents is of constant exponential variety, the
indi¤erence condition EpU [   k] = EpU [w] reads as
Ep(pl
   wl   k) = Ep(w):
Each rm is a price-taker in product and labour markets and chooses its
employment according to the marginal productivity condition lC = (wCp )
;
where  = 1
 1 < 0 and where p is either p or p: In the labour market,
labour supply has to match its demand in the aggregate. The labour market
equilibrium thus requires 1   n = nlC = n(wCp ): The equilibrium wage is
then found as a function of entry and market price
wC(n; p) = p[
1  n
n
]
1
 : (5)
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with the ex post relationship @wC=@n > 0: Thus, in a competitive labour
market, the equilibrium wage is positively related to the number of enter-
prises. Moreover, the optimal size of each enterprise, measured in terms of
hired labour, is related in a simple way to market entry,
lC = (1  n)=n (6)
with @lC=@n < 0:
It is the property of a competitive labour market that there is full job
security. The optimal size of each rm is independent of the state of market
demand. This will be di¤erent in the union model. The wage will absorb a
substantial part of the price risk. However, irreversible entry is risky for an
entrepreneur whose income is the residual. In the expected value sense, it
has to be su¢ cient to compensate for the cost of entry, k. It is illuminating
to solve rst for the equilibrium entry in the absence of entry cost, k = 0; to
see the role paid by the technology. We obtain a clear-cut result:
Proposition 1 Under a competitive labour market and in the absence of
entry cost, entrepreneurship is determined by the degree of returns to scale,
n = 1  :
Proof. Inserting the solutions for wC and lC into the indi¤erence condi-
tion Ep(pl   wl   k) = Ep(w): gives the result.
Several important conclusions arise from this nding. First, the incentive
for market entry is inversely related to the degree of diminishing returns to
scale. Under slowly decreasing returns, there is less room for inframarginal
prots, suggesting that there are fewer enterprises but that they all operate
on a larger scale. Second, in competitive labour markets with costless entry,
there is no risk premium for an entrepreneur who shares the income risk with
hired labour on equal basis. Third, also labour demand is fully determined
by the technology. Insert n = 1   in (6) to obtain lC = =(1  ): Fourth,
the state dependent wage rate is determined both by the technology and the
realized price, wC(p; ) = p[

1  ]
 1.18
Suppose now in stead that entry requires costly ex ante commitment,
k > 0: Such a cost is avoided by entering labour force but it has to be
compensated to a risk-taking entrepreneur. To examine, the right-hand side
of Ep(w) = Ep[p](1 nn )
( 1) is independent of k: Thus one must have
@Ep(pl
 wl k)=@k = @Ep[p(1 )(1 nn ) k]=@k = 0 from the left-hand
18We notice that the link between the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurhip and technology
is explicit in Kanbur (1979). Interestingly, our result is independent of the degree of risk
version.
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side, which is possible only if @n=@k < 0: Entry cost thus reduces the number
of entering rms, n < 1   : In order to have an incentive to enter, a rm
requires a premium over the less risky wage income.
Lemma 2 Entry cost generates a positive risk premium for entering enter-
prises, thus reducing the number of entering rms.
Proof. The result follows from reduced enterprise formation being re-
ected in a lower wage rate, since from equation (5) we see that (@wC=@n) <
0: Consequently, the expected prot of each potential entrepreneur is in-
creased, generating a positive risk premium.
3.2 Wage Bargaining: The Right to Manage
The technological and risk-related e¤ects on incentive of becoming an entre-
preneur will now be augmented by the e¤ects of unionized wage setting. We
assume that the union and the employers share the bargaining power. The
unions bargaining power is  < 1 and the rmsbargaining power is 1   ,
respectively. The fall-back value of the union is taken to be utility when all
1 n workers are unemployed, being eligible to unemployment benet b. The
fall-back value of a rm, in turn, is assumed to be zero production and thus
zero prot. That is, we follow the stadard assumptions in the labour union
models.
The model is solved by backward induction. In the nal stage, the size
of each rm after resolution of price uncertainty and wage negotiation is l =
( w
p
): Due to diminishing returns, rms have access to inframarginal prots.
It is convenient to rewrite the prot function as (w) = l(w)w( 1

  1) > 0
where, one should remember, @l=@w < 0. The wage rate is determined in the
previous stage through bargaining. When entering the market, a potential
entrepreneur is interested in the expected utility of prot, see the indi¤erence
condition (4). It is this indi¤erence condition in the initial stage where the
diminishing marginal utility of consumption plays its role. However, it is the
actual prot in the post-entry stage which the entrepreneurs are concerned
with when participating in the wage negotiation. Thus, the bargaining is
modeled as
max
wN
  = [nl(wN   b) + (1  n)b   (1  n)b][n]1  (7)
subject to l 2 argmax = pl   wN l: As entry rate n is bygone when
bargaining takes place, the maximization problem in (7) is equivalent to
max
wN
  = u1  s.t. l 2 argmax  = pl   wN l:
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We have denoted u = nl(wN   b): With positive inframarginal prots ( >
0), the rst-order condition is given by the weighted average of the elasticities
of the workersutility and the rmsprot with respect to the bargaining
wage:19
u1 [(
uw
u
) + (1  )(w

)] = 0: (8)
In solving for the resulting wage rate, we will make use of the fact that
with inframarginal prots, this condition holds only when the expression
within the square brackets is equal to zero. Notice also that the rms labour
demand is the rms optimal choice, and thus, by the envelope theorem
w =  l: Substituting in (8),

[n @l
@wN
(wN   b) + nlw 1N ]
[nl(wN   b)]
= (1  )( l

):
Since l = (wN
p
) and @l
@wN
= (wN
p
) 1 1
p
, and eliminating ; we obtain
after some manipulation the wage rate
wN = b

 + (1  )
 + (1     + )
 1

: (9)
It is important to notice that in the union model, the wage rate wN does
not depend on the realized price. This should be contrasted to the wage rate
in the competitive case,
wC(p; ) = p[

1   ]
 1;
from above. Otherwise, we see two standard results of the labour union
literature holding here. In the extreme case where the unions bargaining
power is zero, the wage agreed upon equals the exogenous unemployment
compensation, wN( = 0) = b: The other extreme case is where a union is
strong in the sense that it does not need to negotiate about the wage but
is able to impose it unilaterally as a market monopolist. The monopoly
union chooses wN so as to maximize its objective function anticipating the
employment choice by the enterprises. By inserting  = 1 in (9), wN( =
1) = b
h
1
1+( 1)
i 1

: The term in square brackets, 1
1+( 1) > 1, since  < 1
and thus wN( = 1) > b: By di¤erentiating (9) with respect to , we obtain
@wN
@
=   ( 1+)
(+ +( 1+))2 > 0 for all parameter values. Thus, the negotiated
wage rate is increasing in the unions bargaining power. This is a standard
result. After substituting in wN , the labour demand is given by
19We assume that the second-order condition holds.
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l =
"
b
p

 + (1  )
 + (1  )  (1  )
 1

# 1
 1
:
In contrast to the competitive labour market model, the labour demand in
the union model is state-dependent. Finally, we notice that in the union
model, the number of rms in the market, n, does not inuence the outcome
of bargaining nor the labour demand.
4 Enterprise Formation in a Unionized Econ-
omy
We now turn to examine how the strength of the union is reected in the
formation of enterprises and their optimal size. This can be analyzed by
examining @n=@: Changing bargaining power of the union shapes the incen-
tives of the individuals when making their occupational choices.
The fact that the union has bargaining power suggests that wages tend to
be pushed up, leading to fewer jobs available. Naturally, the union incentives
are a¤ected not only by its bargaining power but also by the access of union
members to unemployment compensation. In the initial stage of our model,
the ex ante indi¤erence condition (4) requires
Ep(N   k) = [ nl
1  nw

N +
1  n  nl
1  n b
]+
(1  )[ nl
1  nw

N +
1  n  nl
1  n b
]:
Evaluating both sides, we can rewrite
[(wN ; )  k] + (1  )[(wN ; )  k] (10)
= (wN   b)
n
1  n [l + (1  )l] + b
:
where l = l(p) and l = l(p) are the state-dependent employments. We
now substitute the wage rate from equation (9). The above condition then
states the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurs, nN ; as a function of exogenous
parameters only. In principle, one should be able to solve it for nN . However,
the indi¤erence condition is non-linear in nN ; the rate of entrepreneurship.
Therefore, no closed-form solution is available. However, we are able to
produce a clear-cut analytic result.
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We proceed in two steps. We have already reached the conclusion that
@wN=@ > 0;and now we analyze how the wage rate a¤ects the market entry,
the second link in the process. We use the indi¤erence condition (10) to
examine dn=dwN :
We rst notice that the condition (10) states an equality between two
value functions, one for an individual as a potential entrepreneur and one for
an individual as a potential employee. Since the rms and unions are price-
takers, the left-hand side is independent of the number of entering enterprises.
Totally di¤erentiating (10), we obtain
dnN
dwN
=
Ew[N ]  Ew[UN ]
En[UN ]
: (11)
We can now state our main result
Proposition 3 An increase in the bargained wage rate unambiguously leads
to reduced enterprise formation.
Proof. To evaluate the sign of (11), note rst that the marginal en-
trepreneur understands that an increase in the wage cost reduces expected
prot,
Ew[N ] =  l(   k) 1   (1  )l(   k) 1 < 0:
Here we have made use of the envelope theorem, giving d=dw =  l: An
increased number of enterprises is benecial to workers, since the probability
of obtaining a job both in the good and bad states is higher:
En[UN ] = [l + (1  )l] N
(1  n)2 (w

N   b) > 0:
It remains to analyze the impact of a higher wage on the expected utility of
an employed worker,
Ew[UN ] =
n
1  n[
@l
@w
(wN   b) + lw 1N ] +
n
1  n(1  )[
@l
@w
(wN   b) + lw 1N ]:
There are two o¤setting mechanisms a¤ecting the workers utility. The sec-
ond terms within both square brackets are positive: for any given rate of
entry and any given size of enterprise, a higher wage raises the utility of
each employee. The rst terms are negative because a higher wage leads to
a smaller rm size. It is, however, the positive e¤ect which must dominate,
making Ew[UN ]  0: To see this, it is helpful to consider rst the case of a
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monopoly union with  = 1. By its rst-order condition, it certainly holds
that Ew[UN ] = 0; since the monopoly union has chosen the wage unilaterally
to maximize its expected utility. Then, by the logic of the model, any union
with a lower bargaining power,  < 1; has to face a lower wage, wN < wM ;
where M refers to the monopoly union. The implication is that for such a
union it must hold that Ew[UN ] > 0: This completes the proof.
The current section has derived the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship
and its dependence on the union power. What is the intuition? What deter-
mines the limit to entrepreneurship? In an unionized economy, any potential
entrepreneur (or individual) is assumed to be forward-looking, anticipating
the forthcoming strategic bargaining position. By pushing up the wage rate,
union actions tend to enhance incentives for individuals to abstain from en-
trepreneurship and entering the labour market instead. On the other hand,
higher wages tend to decrease the probability of nding a job, thereby having
a counter e¤ect, i.e. pushing people to entrepreneurship. Our proposition 3
proves that it is the negative e¤ect which dominates.
5 Final Remarks
Our model has considered entrepreneurship under various labour market in-
stitutions. The union e¤ects on entrepreneurship, wage determination, and
the optimal rm size have been analyzed in an occupational choice model. In
the benchmark case with competitive labour markets, entrepreneurship is de-
termined by the underlying technology. Entry cost generates a risk premium
on entrepreneurship. With union power in wage bargaining, our main result
is that the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship is reduced and so is the av-
erage size of enterprises. The robustness of the results could be examined by
extending the model in various directions. For example, one could introduce
a di¤erent assumption of entering entrepreneurs. Having heteregenous entre-
preneurial abilities would extend the model in the direction of rm-specic
risks. We conjecture, however, that as long as a unions strategy results in
wages exceeding the competitive ones, the results will hold. Note, however,
that except for having a short discussion, we have abstained from any norma-
tive statements. Yet, as the European disease is often related to the way its
labour markets operate, we believe that our results provide some additional
insights on this discussion.
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